Perspectives
Securing access to medicines and other health technologies in developing countries continues to be among the major challenges for global health. The challenge lies in ensuring that existing health products are delivered at affordable prices and that innovations and discoveries meet the health needs of developing countries. This policy problem calls for both global and national policy instruments. When in 2001 the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health categorized diseases as type I, II and III based on the extent to which they affected countries at different economic levels, it was alienating for many public health professionals. 1 However, it represented a reality. The classification captured the idea that the existing system provided inadequate incentives for the development of health technologies designed to address diseases that primarily affect developing countries (type II and III diseases).
An underproduction of public goods accounts for the underlying market failure. The knowledge generated by research is truly a public good only if it is made available for anyone to use without restriction. However, such a public good will be underprovided, according to economic theory, since the benefit to society from producing the good will outweigh the returns to the producers of the good. Hence, less knowledge will be generated than is socially desirable. As Nobel Prize winner Joe Stiglitz once noted, "The central public policy implication of public goods is that the state must play some role in the provision of such goods; otherwise they will be undersupplied." He described two strategies that could be adopted: (1) to increase the appropriability/excludability of the returns through intellectual property protection, or (2) to increase direct government support for research and development (R&D). 2 If the public good has global applications, as is the case for most research, a further problem lies in generating collective action by states to avoid free riding.
Intellectual property rights address this problem by allowing producers to capture some of the social benefit through measures such as patents and a time-limited monopoly period. These measures create incentives for private companies to invest in R&D and develop new technologies while also making profits by charging high prices, reflecting R&D costs, during the monopoly period. This model has hitherto worked reasonably well for type I diseases in high-income countries, which have willingly paid prices high enough to incentivize companies to invest in R&D. In poorer countries the system fails to provide adequate incentives because their purchasing power is so small that they are unable to pay the high prices incorporating the R&D costs.
This systemic failure triggered a process in the World Health Organization (WHO) that has now lasted for nearly 10 years. The Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health was established in 2003 after a World Health Assembly (WHA) resolution and issued a report with 60 recommendations in 2006. 3 6 The CEWG analysed more than one hundred different financing and allocation mechanisms proposed by countries, academia, civil society or the private sector. 7 We grouped these proposed mechanisms into 15 categories and analysed them according to a broad array of criteria, including public health impact, efficiency and cost-effectiveness, technical and financial feasibility, intellectual property management, delinking R&D financing from product prices, access to products for patients, governance and accountability and capacity-building. A key assessment criterion was whether the mechanism operated in a way that delinked the costs of R&D from the price of the product, that is, whether R&D was funded from sources other than patent-protected monopoly prices, which would allow the health products to be sold at an affordable cost.
Based on our analysis of the proposals, we reached the following set of rec-
Research and development for developing countries John-Arne Røttingen et al. In addition, we suggest that countries make these commitments within a context in which they invest from 0.05% to 0.10% (developing countries) and from 0.15% to 0.2% (developed countries) of their GDPs in government-funded health research of all kinds, making sure that other areas of health research are also sufficiently addressed. Specific minimum commitments by all countries across all income levels are needed to meet the global challenge of generating R&D that addresses the specific health needs of developing countries. Commitments should be secured through agreements to limit free rider problems, optimize the global contribution to this joint public good and achieve fair burden sharing.
To ensure that proposals are acted upon, the CEWG suggests that the recommendations be implemented through a global binding instrument, specifically an international convention on global health R&D. Such a convention would be under the auspices of WHO and in compliance with Article 19 of the WHO constitution. Its basis could be the agreed Global Strategy and Plan of Action and the CEWG recommendations presented above. We believe the time has come to agree on a concerted framework for R&D targeting the particular health needs of developing countries to ensure that commitments are fulfilled. It is also time to secure knowledge production for global health, which is a global public good, through appropriate regulations. Within the environmental sector several mechanisms rooted in international conventions contribute to the production of public goods.
Our recommendations, if acted upon by the 65th WHA in May 2012, will lead to a system, complementary to the current intellectual property system, that will address the market failures we have identified. Such a system will generate important global public goods by encouraging the fair contributions and active participation of all countries and by stimulating increased collaboration and sharing of knowledge between research institutions. By promoting more public investment and alternatives to product pricing as a way to incentivize and finance R&D, it will ensure the supply of products for developing countries at more affordable prices. These results, we believe, will successfully bring to a close 10 years of effort, to the benefit of the millions of people who are sick or dying because they lack access to the health care products they need. ■ • all countries should commit to spend at least 0.01% of GDP on government-funded R&D devoted to meeting the health needs of developing countries in relation to product development Pooling resources:
• of the funds raised for health R&D addressing the needs of developing countries, 20% to 50% should be channelled through a pooled mechanism Strengthening research and development capacity and technology transfer:
• address the capacity needs of academic and public research organizations in developing countries • utilize direct grants to companies in developing countries Coordination:
• establish a global health R&D observatory and relevant advisory mechanisms under the auspices of WHO Implementation through a binding global instrument for R&D and innovation for health:
• formal negotiations on an international convention on global health R&D should be initiated GDP, gross domestic product; R&D, research and development; WHO, World Health Organization.
